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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Stephen Yeazell's recent essay, The Misunderstood 
Consequences of Modern Civil Process,1 is incisive and provocative. 
Professor Yeazell affords novel ways of apprehending civil process 
while commencing the daunting task of constructing a more compre-
hensive and interrelated account of that process. The essay opens nu-
merous new avenues for exploration and raises many thought-provoking 
questions, and its ideas will spark lively debate across a broad spectrum 
of issues relating to federal civil procedure and the federal courts. 
In Professor Yeazell's essay, he explained that reconfiguring the 
civil litigation process in courts of the first instance while maintaining 
essentially constant the principles of appellate review since the 1930s 
has realigned litigation's power relationships. The focus of civil practice 
has moved from trials to the pretrial process, while circuit courts have 
scrutinized less rigorously district judges' decisionmaking. The essay 
asserted that modifying one constituent of the larger procedural system 
has unleashed the law of unintended consequences, most importantly, 
by shifting considerably more authority to courts of original jurisdic-
tion and transferring some public power into the hands of private 
attorneys. 
Professor Y eazell declined to debate the desirability of the specific 
procedural changes, such as enhanced judicial discretion to manage 
pretrial, that led to the larger transformations, but suggested the need 
for more thorough comprehension of the alterations and for heightened 
sensitivity to their interrelationships. His essay thus began to paint a 
comparatively comprehensive portrait of process as a system. He 
I. Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. 
L. REV. 631. 
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painted a clearer picture of the modifications' connections while en-
couraging proceduralists to view the whole of modern process as more 
than the sum of its discrete parts. 
This article explores a number of significant issues that The Mis-
understood Consequences of Modern Civil Process expressly and im-
plicitly raises. My response primarily elaborates the essay's perceptive 
depiction of authority's accretion in courts of the first instance by em-
phasizing very recent procedural developments, such as implementation 
of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 and the 1993 amend-
ments in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perhaps most striking 
about Professor Yeazell's essay is that the newest aspects of civil pro-
cess, which he examined the least, most compellingly illustrate his 
ideas. Indeed, the CJRA, in vesting courts of original jurisdiction with 
the power not only to apply but also to make relevant procedures, addi-
tionally increases district court authority and explicitly sanctifies that 
enhancement as a positive value. 
This article initially summarizes The Misunderstood Conse-
quences of Modern Civil Process. The article then descriptively ana-
lyzes modern civil process, expanding Professor Yeazell's account and 
concentrating on power's accumulation in courts of the first instance. 
Focus is placed on several phenomena, namely the local proliferation of 
civil procedures, the growth of judicial discretion, and the mounting 
emphasis on pretrial and managerial judging, which have facilitated 
authority's accretion. This response next evaluates important implica-
tions of modern process and concludes with suggestions for treating the 
changed procedural circumstances. 2 
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MISUNDERSTOOD CONSEQUENCES OF MOD-
ERN CIVIL PROCESS 
Professor Yeazell first sketched how the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure modified the mode of civil litigation and changed the junc-
ture at which most civil lawsuits end.3 He showed that civil process 
premised on those Rules has essentially substituted motions at earlier 
2. I emphasize the changes, principally attributable to the Federal Rules, wrought in the 
district courts because those have been the focus of my work. For instance, I leave treatment of 
the appellate process to others. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 
(1994); PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976). I correspondingly focus on 
procedural rather than substantive power, although Professor Yeazell treats both. I also empha-
size the shift in public authority because the transfer of public power to private hands has been 
less significant. 
3. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 632-33. 
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litigation phases for trials, which proportionately decreased by nearly 
four-fifths in the half-century following the 1938 Rules' adoption. 
The essay explains that the Federal Rules recalibrated the trial 
process by interposing numerous new steps between litigation's com-
mencement and trial and that district judges increasingly devote their 
efforts to pretrial tasks, such as resolving discovery controversies, pre-
siding at settlement conferences, and punishing attorneys for miscon-
duct during this stage.4 Appellate scrutiny of the outcomes of cases 
pursued in district courts has correspondingly loosened, even though 
relevant statistics indicate that the work of circuit courts has dramati-
cally expanded. 5 
Professor Yeazell then demonstrated how developments over the 
last half-century altered power relationships in the federal courts by 
severing a close connection between appellate and trial court procedure 
which had developed during the nineteenth century.6 In the 1800s, as 
trial judges began to regulate trials more comprehensively, appellate 
courts fashioned new procedures and closely monitored their use by 
trial courts. Events over the past fifty years broke the link between the 
two tiers. District judges have created increasingly elaborate proce-
dural mechanisms; however, circuit courts did not concomitantly en-
large their supervisory authority. The uncoupling of this linkage be-
tween the judicial system's levels has expanded district court 
independence. 
The essay next explored how interjecting a number of procedural 
steps before trial redesigned civil process in courts of original jurisdic-
tion. 7 The Federal Rules replaced trials with "litigation," a series of 
intermediate phases-discovery, claim and party joinder, and the en-
couragement of settlement by judges-that could have considerable 
tactical significance but would probably escape all judicial, but espe-
cially appellate, scrutiny.8 The corresponding failure to modify require-
ments governing appellate review, the second of a two-variable scheme, 
4. Id. at 636-39. 
5. See id. at 639-40. "[A]ppellate courts, though busier than ever, have decreased their 
control over the outcomes of cases filed in the trial courts." Id. at 640 (emphasis in original). 
6. See id. at 640-41. 
7. See id. at 646-47. See also Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoe-
nix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 961-82 
(1987). 
8. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 646-60. See also Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litiga-
tion," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Summer 1991). 
1995] MORE MODERN CIVIL PROCESS 805 
redistributed authority to courts of original jurisdiction and to attor-
neys. 9 The Rules thus created new litigative activities, motions for 
counsel to file and for district judges to resolve, between pleading and 
trial. Because the principles of appellate jurisdiction remained static, 
however, many of the controversies that arose have evaded immediate 
appellate review.10 
Professor Y eazell concluded with some guidance for those thinking 
about procedural change. He initially answered numerous possible ob-
jections to the essay's arguments which could be premised on other 
writers' work, considering certain of his contentions that diverge from 
these commentators' views and ideas that Professor Yeazell believed 
were novel.11 The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Pro-
cess then urged readers contemplating civil procedure and its modifica-
tion to confront and take into account procedural connectedness and 
mutability.12 Professor Yeazell candidly acknowledged that apprecia-
tion of these phenomena could move proceduralists toward "indetermi-
nate despair," although he suggested that continuing to muddle 
through would be even worse.13 
Ill. ELABORATION OF THE MISUNDERSTOOD CONSEQUENCES OF 
MODERN CIVIL PROCESS 
A. The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The New National 
Uniform Procedural System 
Congress, in passing the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, authorized 
the United States Supreme Court to promulgate procedures which 
would govern civil litigation in the federal district courts.14 During 
1935, the Court named the original Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules and charged it with responsibility for drafting a uniform set of 
procedures that would cover practice in every federal district. In 1942, 
the Supreme Court designated the surviving members of the initial 
Committee as a standing Advisory Committee, and during 1956 the 
9. Yeazell, supra note I, at 660. 
IO. See id. 
ll. See id. at 667-76. 
12. See id. at 676; see also Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 840, 1030 (1984). 
13. Yeazell, supra note 1, at 677-78; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
·Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 433, 494 (1986). 
14. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). See also Carl Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 270, 272-
77 (1989). 
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Court discharged this entity; two years later, Congress assigned the re-
sponsibility for advising the Court to the Judicial Conference which 
appointed a permanent Advisory Committee.15 
The Committee, when crafting the original Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, adoped by the Supreme Court in 1938, had numerous 
objectives in mind.16 The drafters meant to rectify the difficulties of 
common law and code procedure and practice.17 The lawyers specifi-
cally intended to remedy the highly technical character of the prior 
procedural systems, a phenomenon which rigid pleading exemplifi.ed.18 
The Committee also sought to eliminate the complexity attributed to 
the 1872 Conformity Act's command that federal district judges em-
ploy procedures which closely conformed to the procedural require-
ments applied in the state courts of the jurisdictions where, federal 
judges were situated.19 
The Rules seemingly embodied certain procedural tenets. The 
drafters meant to write a national procedure code that was simple, uni-
form and trans-substantive20 while encouraging cases' prompt, inexpen-
sive resolution and their disposition on the merits.21 The Committee 
attempted to attain these objectives in numerous ways. For example, it 
fostered simplicity and merits-based resolution by limiting the signifi.-
15. Order Continuing the Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720 (1942); Order Discharging 
the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956); Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)). The Judicial Conference is the policymaking arm of the federal 
courts. 
16. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. 
L. REV. 494, 502-15 (1986); Tobias, supra note 14, at 272-77; see generally Robert M. Cover, 
For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). It 
is exceedingly difficult to divine the intent of the fourteen practicing attorneys and law professors, 
none of whom is alive today, and each Committee member probably held varying views on the 
wealth of issues that the Committee confronted. See Resnik, supra, at 498-99, 508; Tobias, supra, 
at 274. It is possible, however, to construct plausible, multiple accounts of those aspects of the 
drafters' work that are most relevant to the issues that Professor Yeazell raises by drawing princi-
pally upon secondary historical sources. 
17. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 7, at 914-21, 926-73; Tobias, supra note 14, at 270, 272-
73. 
18. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 13, at 439; see generally Subrin, supra note 7, at 948-73. 
See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE (1965). 
19. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196, 197. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 61 (5th ed. 1994). 
20. See Cover, supra note 16, at 718. See generally Carl Tobias, The Transformation of 
Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992). 
21. For discussion of these, and other important, objectives of the drafters, see Resnik, 
supra note 16, at 502-15; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 61 
A.BA. J. 1648 (1981); Tobias, supra note 14, at 272-77. 
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cance of pleadings, by prescribing open-ended discovery, and by re-
stricting somewhat the number of steps in lawsuits.22 The drafters cor-
respondingly increased uniformity by mandating that each district 
employ the same procedures.23 The Committee also afforded lawyers 
considerable control over their litigation, especially before trial during 
discovery.24 It concomitantly enhanced judicial discretion and trusted 
substantially to judges' discretion the enforcement of the Rules, which 
the Committee envisioned that courts would flexibly and pragmatically 
apply.25 
Particularly relevant to important issues which Professor Y eazell 
raises was the drafters' decision to include Rule 83.26 That provision 
empowered all districts and individual judges to adopt local procedures, 
thus authorizing their promulgation of local requirements which could 
undermine the national, uniform, simple regime of civil procedure insti-
tuted.27 The Advisory Committee did cabin this grant. The drafters ap-
parently intended that districts would sparingly invoke Rule 83 in re-
sponse to peculiar, problematic local conditions28 and proscribed local 
rules which conflict with the Federal Rules.29 
In short, this account resembles in significant measure, but departs 
somewhat from, Professor Yeazell's description. For instance, this arti-
cle agrees that the Advisory Committee's determinations to enlarge ju-
dicial discretion and emphasize pretrial would lead to authority's accre-
22. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 21, at 1649-50; Tobias, supra note 14, at 274. See also 
Marcus, supra note 13, at 439-40. 
23. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 14, at 274. 
24. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 16, at 512-15; Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650. 
25. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 7, at 968-73; Tobias, supra note 14, at 275-76 & n.28. 
These basic procedural precepts should not be viewed as absolutes. Indeed, several of the tenets 
were in tension and even conflicted. For instance, the choices of an equity-dominated scheme, by 
essentially merging law into equity, and of a flexible, liberal procedural regime correspondingly 
expanded federal court access and encouraged complex cases which could be expensive and time 
consuming. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 1589, 1592 n.13 (1994); see also infra notes 38, 41, 43 and accompanying text. The 
Rules, by affording counsel considerable, and judges somewhat less, control over litigation may 
have facilitated unfocused suits and broad discovery which imposed costs and delay. See infra 
notes 38, 41-43 and accompanying text. 
26. See FED. R. C!v. P. 83. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, 
and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1999, 2016-19 (1989). 
27. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83; see also supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text. 
28. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83 advisory comm. note. See also Subrin, supra note 26, at 2011-
16. 
29. See FED. R. C!v. P. 83. See also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkaniza-
tion of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393, 1397-99 (1992). 
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tion in courts of the first instance and that the drafters' decisions to 
expand, and accord attorneys significant control over, discovery, and to 
encourage the full revelation of relevant material would shift some 
power into private lawyers' hands. This article also concurs in the es-
say's suggestion that the committee evinced little self-awareness about 
how the procedural system that it formulated might distribute federal 
court authority. 
This analysis differs in certain respects from Professor Yeazell's 
account. For example, he asserted that the Federal Rules, "drafted 
during the New Deal as many aspects of U.S. political life were cen-
tralizing ... decentralized power within the federal judiciary."30 The 
Rules, as applied, and perhaps as written, may have had this effect on 
substantive judicial authority, but the contention is not true of the pro-
cedural regime instituted, of the rulemaking or rule revising power, or 
of the entities responsible for amendment. 
The Advisory Committee's purposes in crafting the 1938 Rules 
and the provisions actually promulgated thus reflected important coun-
tervailing tendencies. The drafters clearly intended to adopt a national 
uniform procedural code with Federal Rules that would specifically re-
verse the Conformity Act's decentralizing effect and that would apply 
in all federal districts, subject to limited provision for local proce-
dures.31 The Rules Enabling Act also authorized court rulemaking by 
the Supreme Court, and it correspondingly entrusted development of 
the original Rules and their subsequent revision to centralized national 
entities, namely the Advisory Committee, which were to formulate pro-
posals that created, protected and maintained a national uniform sys-
tem. Indeed, Professor Yeazell astutely acknowledged that the statute, 
"with its hierarchically dictated uniformity . . . represents the old re-
gime," analogizing it to the Catholic Church, which "stood for uni-
formity in doctrine and practice."32 
30. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 675-76. 
31. See supra notes 19-20, 27-29 and accompanying text. 
32. See Yeazell, supra note l, at 672 n.134. He contrasts the Rules Enabling Act with the 
Civil Justice Reform Act "which abandons uniformity ... [and] is the procedural equivalent of 
Luther's Ninety Five Theses" analogizing it to Protestantism which stood for a "diversity of prac-
tices according to the individual conscience." Id. These analogies should not be taken too literally 
or too far. Luther's Theses were carefully considered doctrinal developments, whereas certain im-
portant procedural developments described here apparently received little conscious thought. See 
infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
Professor Yeazell and I may be addressing different concepts and could even be talking past 
each other. For example, I emphasize a centralized, uniform procedural system with centralized 
rule amendment authority and centralized rule revisors. He stresses decentralized judicial power. 
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B. The First Three Decades of the Federal Rules: Keeping the Faith 
The national rule revisors, particularly the Advisory Committee 
and the federal judiciary, preserved, sustained and fostered fundamen-
tal tenets such as uniformity and simplicity over the thirty years follow-
ing the Federal Rules' adoption in 1938, and the Rules received a 
warm reception.33 The Committee proposed relatively few changes, 
while judges encountered little difficulty interpreting and enforcing the 
original Rules and praised the strictures' efficacy.34 The courts retained 
simplicity with a general, notice pleading scheme that they pragmati-
cally and liberally applied.311 Many districts and individual judges 
maintained and promoted uniformity by prescribing a comparatively 
small number of local procedures, especially ones which contravened 
the Federal Rules.36 
Certain 1938 Rules proved to be less effective, and a few of the 
basic procedural tenets were undermined.37 For example, open-ended 
discovery led to several difficulties, such as increased cost and delay, 
and numerous counsel capitalized on attorney control over that process 
to take unfair advantage of their opponents, particularly in complex 
cases.36 
Perhaps most relevant to Professor Yeazell's ideas was the willing-
ness of some districts and individual judges to promulgate local proce-
dures, especially provisions which conflicted with the Federal Rules, 
The ideas that we emphasize can be harmonized. For instance, centralized entities could exercise 
centralized authority to adopt a centralized, uniform procedural system that decentralized judicial 
power. See also infra notes 71, S3, llO and accompanying text. 
33. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note 14, at 277-79; Tobias, supra note 25, at 
1591-92. 
34. See articles in Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, SS CoLUM. L. REV. 
435 (195S); Charles E. Clark, Clarifying Amendments to the Federal Rules, 14 OHIO Sr. L.J. 241 
(1953). See generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 435; Tobias, supra note 14, at 277-7S. 
35. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Marcus, 
supra note 13, at 439-40, 445-46. 
36. See Subrin, supra note 26, at 2016-19. See also infra notes 39-40 and accompanying 
text. Some revisions, such as the 1966 party joinder amendments, expanded the Rules' flexible, 
liberal nature and judicial discretion. See FEo. R. C1v. P. 19, 23 & 24. See also Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, SS MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1469 (19S7) (book review) (1966 
revisions made triumph of equity complete). See generally Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of 
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), Sl 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 591 (1967-6S). 
37. See Tobias, supra note 14, at 27S; Tobias, supra note 25, at 1593. 
3S. See, e.g., New Dyckman Theater Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheus Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See also Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 
SS COLUM. L. REV. 4SO (195S) (contemporaneous account); Subrin, supra note 7, at 9S2-S4 (sub-
sequent account). 
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thereby honoring in the breach Rule 83's proscription on inconsis-
tency. 39 Indeed, a mere two years after the initial Rules' issuance, the 
Knox Committee reported that many local rules which pre-dated Rule 
83's adoption and were in conflict had not been abrogated and that 
numerous local rules prescribed after the 1938 Federal Rules' promul-
gation were inconsistent;'0 This local procedural proliferation facili-
tated power's accretion in courts of the first instance and eroded na-
tional uniformity. 
The original Rule 83's implementation, accordingly, illustrates the 
law of unintended consequences and procedural mutability and con-
nectedness. Districts and individual judges seized upon Rule 83, which 
was meant to afford flexibility in addressing peculiar, difficult local 
conditions and whose invocation was hedged with prohibitions, particu-
larly on adopting conflicting local requirements, to prescribe rather 
broad local procedures which enhanced trial court power and under-
mined uniformity. 
This article's account thus substantially accords with Professor 
Yeazell's. We agree that the experiment with the 1938 Rules during 
the three decades after their promulgation was successful. Professor 
Y eazell suggested that the Rules' perceived success derived from their 
content. The Rules' content was probably significant, although the 
Rules were also successful because the national revision entities and the 
federal bench preserved and maintained a uniform, simple procedural 
system. Moreover, Professor Yeazell contended that the original Rules' 
structure, enhanced emphasis on pretrial, and increased judicial discre-
tion facilitated power's accumulation in courts of original jurisdiction. 
Those phenomena may have been important, but so was local proce-
dural proliferation. 
C. The Federal Rules Since the 1970s: The Rise of the Reformation 
During the 1970s, several developments led to growing disenchant-
ment with the Federal Rules' regime. Numerous critics argued that the 
federal courts were experiencing a "litigation explosion"41 in which at-
39. See Subrin, supra note 26, at 2016-19. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 83; supra notes 26-29 
and accompanying text. 
40. See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON LOCAL DISTRICT 
COURT RULES III 1-11 (1940). See generally Subrin, supra note 26, at 2016-19. 
41. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipa-
tion, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE at 23 (A. Leo Levin 
& Russell Wheeler eds., 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation- Have Good 
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torneys and parties were filing too many civil cases, too few of which 
had merit.42 Others voiced concern about litigation abuse, especially 
throughout discovery.43 Some observers claimed that the Federal Rules 
were unresponsive to these complications and that certain aspects of 
the original Rules, such as their flexible, liberal nature and provision 
for open-ended discovery controlled by counsel, had even created the 
problems. A number of prescriptions for the difficulties focused on phe-
nomena, such as pretrial's increased importance, that Professor Yeazell 
identified; factors, namely local proliferation, that this article examines; 
or considerations, such as enlarged judicial discretion and greater em-
phasis on managerial judging, which both treat. All of these phenom-
ena contributed to power's accretion in courts of original jurisdiction. 
1. Managerial Judging: Increased Court Control and Individual 
Understandings of Process 
During the late 1970s, numerous judges, particularly in heavily-
populated districts, such as the Northern District of California, started 
crafting ad hoc solutions to these complications, a practice dubbed 
"managerial judging."44 Judges created a plethora of procedures that 
enabled them to participate more actively in civil cases, especially dur-
ing pretrial. Courts used pretrial conferences to guide litigation's pace, 
to formulate and resolve contested issues, and to foster settlement, par-
ticularly by encouraging reliance on various alternatives to dispute res-
olution (ADR).45 A number of judges more closely controlled discov-
ery's breadth or speed, while some courts sanctioned lawyers or parties 
for discovery or litigation abuse.46 Judges also developed innovative 
techniques, such as mandatory summary jury trials and minitrials, to 
Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 211-12. See also Tobias, supra note 14, at 287-89 (discussing 
debate over litigation explosion). 
42. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); Miller, supra note 7. 
43. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Order Amending the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
44. See STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS {1977); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholar-
ship, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 647, 657-78 (1988). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 {1982). 
45. See, e.g., Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 424 (1986) (ADR); Robert F. Peckham, The 
Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 
69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Resnik, supra note 44, at 391-400. 
46. See Peckham, supra note 45; Resnik, supra note 44, at 391-400. 
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address the problems.47 These developments, which expanded judicial 
discretion to manage the pretrial process and which were frequently 
realized through the adoption of local procedures that conflicted with 
the Federal Rules, facilitated authority's accumulation in courts of the 
first instance.48 
2. The 1983 Federal Rules Amendments: Erosion of the National 
Uniform Procedural System 
The 1983 amendments in Rules 11, 16 and 26 enlarged lawyers' 
duties to act as officers of the court, increased judges' discretion to con-
trol and manage litigation, particularly in pretrial and discovery, and 
commanded courts to levy sanctions when attorneys or parties contra-
vened the revisions' requirements.49 Amended Rule 16 enhanced dis-
trict judges' power to manage litigation through the use of pretrial con-
ferences and scheduling orders and by sanctioning rule violations.150 
Revised Rule 26 authorized courts to limit discovery's extent and pace 
and to sanction infractions of the provision's strictures.151 Amended 
47. See E. ALLAN LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN 
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 
70 F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
48. Numerous districts and individual judges effectuated much managerial judging, particu-
larly before the 1983 Federal Rules revisions, by promulgating local procedural requirements, a 
number of which conflicted with the Federal Rules. Insofar as Professor Yeazell treats managerial 
judging, our accounts substantially agree. 
49. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) [herein-
after Order]; Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil 
Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991). See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE 1983 AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGE-
MENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984). The adoption of revisions to Federal Rules 11, 16, 
and 26 during 1983, therefore, effectively codified measures that courts had applied under the 
heading of managerial judging. See also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
50. See Order, supra note 49. See also Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 
49, at 942-46. See generally In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 
1011-13 (1st Cir. 1988). Rule 16 expressly denominated numerous matters that would be appro-
priate for treatment at pretrial conferences: discussion of settlement prospects, of using extra-
judicial processes to resolve suits, of employing special mechanisms to manage litigation that in-
volved "complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions or unusual proof problems" and 
of issue formulation, the advisability of amending pleadings, ways to avoid unnecessary proof, and 
witness and document identification. 
51. See Order, supra note 49. See also Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 
14, at 292 n.148. The 1983 amendments in Rules 16 and 26 and the 1985 second edition of the 
Manual for Complex Litigation, which prescribed different procedures for resolving particular 
types of complex cases, such as mass tort suits, by assuming that judges would tailor procedures, 
often ad hoc, to specific cases, increased judicial power and discretion. See i;ubrin, supra, at 1650; 
Tobias, supra, at 292 n.148. 
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Rule 11 augmented the two changes' prescriptions for managerial judg-
ing by mandating sanctions for the failure of counsel and litigants to 
perform reasonable inquiries before filing papers and required greater 
responsibility and accountability from lawyers.52 
These 1983 revisions illustrate much that Professor Yeazell sug-
gested. All three amendments significantly expanded district courts' au-
thority by multiplying the number of steps, and the opportunities for 
judicial decisionmaking, in pretrial; by imposing on attorneys an in-
creased number of, and more onerous, obligations; and by substituting 
court control for lawyers' self-regulation, especially during pretrial and 
discovery. The revisions concomitantly extended the movement from 
trial to pretrial begun in 1938 and enhanced judicial discretion, much 
of which exercise was effectively unreviewable, to manage that process. 
Modified Rule 11 fostered power's accretion by enlarging judicial dis-
cretion to regulate and punish attorney and litigant misbehavior in the 
pretrial, and even the prefiling, stage. Amended Rule l 6's provision for 
courts during pretrial conferences to discuss the possibilities of settle-
ment and of employing extra-judicial alternatives for resolving disputes 
correspondingly vested greater authority in courts of original jurisdic-
tion and shifted some public power into private hands. 
The developments that led to the 1983 changes and those revisions 
also demonstrate Professor Yeazell's allusions to the law of unintended 
consequences and procedure's mutable and interconnected nature. The 
1938 drafters' decision to cede counsel considerable control over the 
pretrial process and the perceived need in 1983 to temper that determi-
nation's effects are illustrative. Some attorneys did not cooperate dur-
ing pretrial. They capitalized on lawyer self-regulation for improper 
strategic benefit, thus necessitating increased judicial discretion to 
manage the pretrial phase and additionally emphasizing that stage as 
the dominant focus for disposition. 53 The notice pleading regime insti-
tuted in 1938 correspondingly foreclosed reliance on pleading as an im-
portant mode of resolution and reinforced others, namely pretrial. Flex-
ible pleading allowed parties to avoid dismissal and to reach discovery, 
52. See Order, supra note 49. The rule revisors changed the 1938 Rule 11, although they 
had minimal empirical data on the original provision which was rarely invoked. See Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1993). The amendment, by mandating sanc-
tions' imposition, reduced judicial discretion to sanction, but increased judicial power and control. 
53. See Miller, supra note 7; Resnik, supra note 44, at 397. See also supra notes 38, 43 and 
accompanying text. 
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which improved their prospects for settling and proving cases.54 More 
generally, the 1938 Rules stressed simplicity and uniformity, but the 
1983 amendments emphasized prompt, inexpensive dispute resolution 
in treating delay, cost and excesses which the initial Rules apparently 
made possible through such procedural provisions as notice pleading 
and open-ended discovery.55 
This account of the 1983 revisions comports as a descriptive mat-
ter with Professor Yeazell's rather limited treatment of the amend-
ments.56 We agree that the 1983 modifications enlarged district courts' 
power by enhancing judicial discretion to manage the increasingly im-
portant pretrial and apparently responded to certain aspects of the uni-
form, flexible regime instituted in 1938. He seemingly views the decen-
tralization of authority effected by the 1983 amendments as confirming 
and deepening procedural developments which commenced in 1938. 
This perception of the 1983 revisions' impact on power of courts of 
original jurisdiction appears accurate, but the amendments also repre-
sented a departure from important tenets, namely national uniformity, 
that animated the drafters of the original Federal Rules.57 
3. Local Procedural Proliferation as Reformation 
a. How Local Proliferation Occurred 
The proliferation of local procedures is important to many of Pro-
fessor Yeazell's ideas and has been integral to power's accumulation in 
courts of the first instance,58 but his essay minimally treated that devel-
opment.59 During 1986, the Judicial Conference commissioned the Lo-
54. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 439-40, 445-46; Miller, supra note 7. 
55. The perception that the liberal, uniform system of the original Federal Rules was sub-
stantially responsible for the litigation explosion and litigation abuse concomitantly led the 1983 
drafters to accord judges greater discretion in controlling the increasingly emphasized pretrial 
process. 
56. See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 1, at 657-60. 
57. The composition of the institutions responsible for national rule revision may also ex-
plain the 1983 amendments. Some observers have suggested that the federal judiciary's increasing 
dominance of the relevant committees has led the rule revisors to draft amendments that reflect 
growing solicitude for the needs of the federal bench, rather than of lawyers, litigants or the 
public. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 897 (1992); John 
Frank, Rule 11-The Need to Start Over (May 1, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file 
with author); Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Reforming the Federal Rules Reformers, 
NAT'L LJ., June 29, 1992, at 15. 
58. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note 25, at 1595-98; Tobias, supra note 29, at 
1397-99. See also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
59. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672 (alluding to local rulemaking in context of discussion 
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cal Rules Project to assemble and organize all local rules, standing or-
ders of individual judges, and additional local requirements. 60 
In 1989, the Project issued its report finding that courts had 
adopted some 5000 local rules and many other procedures, variously 
denominated general, standing, special, scheduling or minute orders 
which govern local practice.61 A number of these strictures eonflicted 
with the Federal Rules, provisions in the United States Code, or proce-
dures in the remaining ninety-three districts. Districts and individual 
judges promulgated and implemented inconsistent measures, notwith-
standing proscriptions on that practice in the Rules Enabling Act and 
in Rule 83.62 
The Local Rules Project ascertained that the local requirements 
regulated a broad range of procedural matters. The most widely 
adopted procedures covered the pretrial process, particularly pretrial 
conferences and discovery.63 Quite a few courts created and applied 
special mechanisms for tracking and for attempting to resolve rather 
early in litigation routine, simple cases. Moreover, a substantial num-
ber of districts prescribed presumptive numerical limitations for 
interrogatories. 64 
The local procedures' substance and the ways that they were 
adopted, communicated, and enforced appeared more responsive to the 
perceived needs of local judges, lawyers, and litigants, or of these 
of CJRA). 
60. See COMMITIEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT]. See also Daniel R. Coquillette et 
al., The Role of Local Rules, 15 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989) (summary of Local Rules Project). 
61. See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 60. Telephone interview with 
Mary P. Squiers, Project Director of Local Rules Project (Feb. 21, 1992); Stephen N. Subrin, 
Consultant to the Local Rules Project (Feb. 15, 1992). Many individual judges applied a plethora 
of procedures which were not in writing. See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 3-4 (Dec. 1991) (co-equal assignment 
of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate judges). See also Letter from Judge Avern 
Cohn, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, to Carl Tobias (Feb. 13, 1994) 
(applying unwritten procedures). See generally Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Justice 
Plan, 53 MONT. L. REv. 91, 93 n.9 (1992). 
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); FED. R Civ. P. 83. See also Subrin, 
supra note 26, at 2020-26. See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 60, at 62-65. 
63. See REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT, supra note 60, at 1-3. 
64. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 
CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 17, 1991) (referring to inconsis-
tent local procedure); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING, CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Dec. 31, 1991) (same). See also Subrin, 
supra note 26, at 2020-26. 
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judges vis-a-vis the attorneys and parties, than to concerns about na-
tional uniformity and simplicity. For example, numerous districts im-
posed restrictions on counsel who were not members of the bars of 
those states in which the courts were located.65 Some individual judges 
even commanded lawyers to secure advance permission before filing 
motions.66 Many districts and specific judges promulgated requirements 
governing certain areas of practice without consulting attorneys or the 
public before, and sometimes after, issuing the procedures.67 
Little appellate scrutiny attended the prescription or application of 
these measures.68 The small monetary amount and the ostensibly eso-
teric procedural principles at stake probably discouraged most potential 
challenges. Some lawyers or litigants possessing sufficient interest and 
the wherewithal to pursue the mechanisms' invalidation might have 
been reluctant to attack procedures adopted by judges before whom 
they would appear in the future. A number of those few possible chal-
lenges remammg may have involved unreviewable judicial 
determinations. 69 
This account of local procedural proliferation confirms and elabo-
rates certain of Professor Yeazell's ideas. It shows how local procedures 
were important to authority's accretion in courts of original jurisdiction 
and how they facilitated the transfer of some public power to private 
hands. Local procedures additionally emphasized and enhanced judicial 
discretion to manage pretrial and reduced appellate scrutiny of district 
judges' decisionmaking. Courts' ostensible reliance on Rule 83's narrow 
grant to adopt procedures much broader than the provision allows and 
the 1938 drafters contemplated manifests the law of unintended conse-
quences. The experience demonstrates interconnectedness because, for 
instance, the local procedures' widespread adoption has seriously 
65. See, e.g., MT. R. 110; E.D. VA. R. 7. See also Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987). 
See generally Coquillette et al., supra note 60, at 64. 
66. See, e.g., Richardson Greenshields Securities Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987). 
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 332 notes (1993). 
67. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 2071 
notes (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
68. I rely substantially here on A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the 
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1991). 
69. The procedures also received little scrutiny from circuit judicial councils which Congress 
accorded review responsibilities. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also id. 
notes; FED. R. Civ. P. 83, 1985 advisory comm. note; infra notes 73-74, 78-79 and accompanying 
text. 
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eroded the national, uniform system of procedure embodied in the Fed-
eral Rules. 70 
The foregoing procedural developments that led to the accumula-
tion in courts of the first instance of additional power could be de-
scribed as a reformation. Thus perceived, authority's accretion, made 
possible by local proliferation and uniformity's er-0si-0n, which the "lo-
cal rulemakers, each guided by individual understandings of process" 
had effected, was the "procedural equivalent of Luther's Ninety-Five 
Theses."71 
b. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1988: Responses to Lo-
cal Procedural Proliferation as a Counter-Reformation 
The federal judiciary and Congress responded in several ways to 
the difficulties posed by local proliferation.72 The Judicial Conference 
championed Federal Rule 83's 1985 amendment which required that 
districts promulgate local rules after affording public notice and oppor-
tunity for comment and that individual-judge standing orders not con-
flict with the Federal Rules or local rules.73 The advisory committee 
note which attended the revision requested that every district institute 
processes for issuing and monitoring these orders and urged circuit ju-
dicial councils to evaluate all local rules for validity and for consistency 
with Federal Rules and with local procedures in other districts.7' 
One-half century after the 1938 Rules became effective, Congress 
passed the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (JIA) of 
1988, significant purposes of which were to restrict local proliferation 
and to restore the primacy of the Federal Rules and of national rule 
revision.75 Congress apparently intended that the statute revitalize, 
70. The developments also eroded the influence of national rule revision entities, undercut 
their efforts to protect and maintain the national, uniform regime, and greatly complicated federal 
civil practice for many counsel and parties. See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text. 
71. Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672 n.134; see also id. (Protestants stood for a "diversity of 
practices according to the individual conscience"). See generally supra note 32, infra note 83. 
72. I emphasize the congressional response because it could have more profound effects. The 
Judicial Conference commissioned the Local Rules Project to study the problems and when the 
Conference received the Project's Report, it issued an order requesting that the districts conform 
local procedures to the Federal Rules and making numerous other suggestions for treating local 
proliferation. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1597; Tobias, supra note 29, at 1399. See also supra 
notes 58-71 and accompanying text. 
73. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 83, 1985 advisory committee's note. 
74. See FED. R. C1v. P. 83, 1985 advisory committee's note. 
75. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 
Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 332(d)(4), 2071-2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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maintain and enhance important procedural tenets, namely uniformity 
and simplicity, which motivated the original Advisory Committee.76 
Congress meant to treat local proliferation by systematizing and 
opening to public scrutiny local procedural amendment processes. The 
legislation required each district court to name a local rules committee 
that would assist all the district's judges in formulating local proce-
dures and to provide notice and comment when adopting new, or 
amending existing, local rules.77 Congress also attempted to limit 
proliferation by imposing on circuit judicial councils the affirmative re-
sponsibility to scrutinize periodically all local procedures for consis-
tency with the Federal Rules and by empowering councils to change or 
abolish any requirements deemed in confl.ict.78 Congress seems to have 
intended that these mandates cover individual-judge procedures.79 
This legislative activity reinforces certain of Professor Yeazell's 
ideas, but in his essay he only alluded to the JIA.80 The Act's passage 
apparently evinces congressional recognition that original Rule 83 had 
unintended consequences in that judges purportedly relied on the provi-
sion's circumscribed authorization to prescribe measures considerably 
broader than the Rule permitted and the 1938 drafters envisioned.81 
The statute's enactment also illustrates procedural connectedness. For 
instance, the strictures on promulgation of local requirements probably 
sacrifice certain flexibility which districts and judges need to adopt pro-
cedures that will treat unusual, troubling local conditions.82 The legisla-
tive action correspondingly demonstrates procedural mutability. For ex-
ample, the effort to restore uniformity and the primacy of the Federal 
Rules and of national rule revision which local proliferation eroded 
shows that procedural values can have changing significance over time. 
76. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1599-1601. 
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (1988). The JIA thus imposed a continuing obligation on 
the councils to review local procedures existing on the legislation's December 1, 1988 effective 
date and any requirements thereafter prescribed. See also Tobias, supra note 25, at 1623-27 
(1990 CJRA effectively suspended 1988 JIA). · 
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 notes (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The statute made the amend-
ment process exclusive in an effort to prevent districts and judges from avoiding the requirements 
by denominating local procedures something else, such as a standing order. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 207l(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
80. Indeed, he treats it so minimally that I do not even attempt to reconcile our accounts. 
See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672 n.134. 
81. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1595-98; see also supra notes 26-29, 39-40 and accompa-
nying text. 
82. See Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 869-71 (1989). See also Levin, supra note 68. 
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These developments, particularly in Congress, five decades after 
the 1938 Rules took effect, therefore, could be characterized as a 
counter-reformation against power's devolution from the center to the 
local trial courts, insofar as local procedural proliferation facilitated 
that development. Thus viewed, the strictures on proliferation, espe-
cially in the 1988 JIA but also in Rule 83's 1985 amendment, "declar-
ing holy war on the local rulemakers, each guided by individual under-
standings of process ... would constitute [a] Council of Trent and the 
start of the real procedural counter-reformation."83 
4. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: The Deepening Reforma-
tion, or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Counter-
Reformation 
Congressional passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
and statutory effectuation essentially suspended implementation of the 
1988 JIA's directives which were meant to limit local procedural 
proliferation. The way that Congress enacted the CJRA, the legisla-
tion's requirements, and its effectuation tellingly illustrate many of 
Professor Y eazell's ideas and enrich his account of modern civil pro-
cess, although he tersely examined the statute.84 
a. Statutory Passage 
In early 1990, Senator Joseph Biden, the Chair of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, introduced a bill which was substantially premised on 
suggestions for improving the civil justice system-suggestions that 
were developed by a task force comprising diverse federal court users.815 
This legislation was quite controversial. Numerous judges criticized the 
measure because it required that each district implement a number of 
procedures to reduce expense and delay. Others thought that the bill 
83. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672 n.134. I obviously have taken this quotation out of 
context because Professor Yeazell so minimally treats the JIA. See also supra notes 32, 71, infra 
note 110 and accompanying text. 
84. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672-73. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra note 25, 
at 1601-04. 
85. See S. 2648, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See also SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
S. REP. No. 416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990). The task force found considerable dissatis-
faction with the federal civil justice system, determined that increasing expense and delay in civil 
litigation threatened court access for numerous individuals, and suggested that federal courts insti-
tute reforms principally involving judicial case management, discovery, and ADR. See TASK 
FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING 
COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 5-6, 12-19 (1989) [hereinafter BROOKINGS REPORT]. 
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constituted a congressional effort to micro-manage the courts which by-
passed or potentially threatened the normal federal rule revision pro-
cess and the work of the Federal Courts Study Committee which Con-
gress had commissioned in the 1988 JIA.86 Indeed, the proponents of 
the 1990 legislation evinced little cognizance that the JIA had passed a 
short two years earlier, and there apparently was no attempt to harmo-
nize the measures. The Judicial Conference eventually developed a 
"Fourteen-Point Plan" which responded to Senator Biden's bill.87 Fol-
lowing hearings and negotiations with the Conference, Congress en-
acted a modified version of the legislation in November 1990.88 
The CJRA was controversial at the time of passage and has re-
mained so. Some critics question whether the federal courts have exper-
ienced serious delay. Two important 1990 studies found less delay, es-
pecially in the sense of time to disposition, than many suggested.89 
Additional observers contend that the Act does not treat significant 
causes of cost and delay, namely the criminal justice system.90 More-
over, the statute's express purpose was the encouragement of experi-
mentation with local procedures for reducing expense and delay in civil 
litigation, to the nearly complete exclusion of other important process 
values and procedural tenets, particularly uniformity.91 The CJRA also 
established unrealistic goals and time frames and created entities which 
lacked expertise or assigned them unclear responsibilities. Much of the 
Act conflicted with, and its implementation effectively suspended, the 
1988 JIA's initiatives aimed at local proliferation.92 This brief descrip-
86. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 85, at 4-6, 10, 30-31. See also Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (commissioning Federal Courts Study Committee). 
87. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 85, at 4-6, 30-31; see also Lauren K. Robel, The 
Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 115, 128 (1991). This 
judicial opposition was somewhat ironic because the CJRA increased courts' power and discretion, 
particularly to manage the increasingly emphasized pretrial with inconsistent local procedures. 
88. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-479 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also S. REP. No. 416, supra 
note 85, at 3-6. 
89. See WOLF HYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990); TERENCE DUNWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, 
RAND CORPORATION, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
(1990). 
90. See, e.g., Avern Cohn, A Judge's View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 
54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 99, 100-03 (Summer 1991); Linda s. Mullenix, The Counter-Ref-
ormation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 400-01 (1992). Of course, the 1994 fed-
eral crime legislation will exacerbate this problem. 
91. See infra notes 93, 97-98 and accompanying text. See also Burbank, supra note 36, at 
1466-71 (discussing process values). But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating 
explicit purpose of civil justice plans was to facilitate court access, an important process value). 
92. For example, Congress identified or created instrumentalities to monitor statutory effec-
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tion of the 1990 legislation's passage and considerable material that 
follows, therefore, epitomize many of Professor Yeazell's ideas. 
b. Statutory Requirements and Implementation 
The CJRA required that by December 1993 all districts adopt 
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans which were "to facilitate 
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, 
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive resolutions of civil disputes."93 The courts were to issue the plans 
after examining reports and recommendations developed by advisory 
groups,94 entities that the districts named ninety days after the Act's 
passage and which were to have balanced composition.95 The district 
courts analyzed the groups' reports and suggestions and considered in-
cluding in plans the eleven statutorily-prescribed principles, guidelines, 
and techniques and any other procedures that they believed would re-
duce delay and cost.96 In short, the CJRA's advocates hoped that this 
method for generating reform "from the bottom up" would promote 
innovation while improving communication and fostering consensus 
among federal court users and within and across federal districts.97 
It is important to emphasize that the eleven measures provided in 
the legislation exclusively govern pretrial and significantly increase dis-
tuation but assigned the entities comparatively unclear responsibilities which decreased their abil-
ity to treat the proliferation of inconsistent local procedures fostered by the CJRA. See Tobias, 
supra note 25, at 1617-27; Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 115 (1993). See also S. 2047, 103d Cong., 2d Sess (1994) (proposing extension of 
statutory time frames); see infra note 95. 
93. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 103(b)(l), 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
94. 28 U.S.C. § 472 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
95. They were to include lawyers and other persons representative of civil litigants. See 28 
U.S.C. § 478 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Groups were to evaluate the "state of the court's civil and 
criminal dockets"; "identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the court's 
resources"; and designate the "principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation" in the district. 
See id. § 472. The groups' recommendations were to treat the particular needs and circumstances 
of the district, its parties, and their counsel while guaranteeing that all of them contribute signifi-
cantly to "reducing cost and delay and thereby facilitating access to the courts." See id. § 472. 
These groups and their duties show how Congress selected entities and assigned them respon-
sibilities which could increase power's accretion primarily by exacerbating local procedural 
proliferation and inconsistency, which increased cost and delay. For example, numerous advisory 
groups lacked balanced composition, while the above statutory requirements may have led them to 
draft recommendations that appeared more solicitous of the needs of local judges, attorneys and 
parties than of national uniformity. 
96. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-73 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
97. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1604. 
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trict judges' discretion to manage this phase.98 By comparison, several 
of the mechanisms expressly seek to limit judicial involvement in the 
disposition of disputes and even encourage lawyers and litigants to re-
solve privately part or all of their controversies.99 
The CJRA's twelfth open-ended prescription constituted an im-
plicit invitation that courts adopt and apply local procedures which 
contravene the Federal Rules, United States Code provisions and other 
districts' procedures.100 A number of courts apparently relied on the 
statute's last proviso to implement measures that conflict with external 
requirements, while numerous districts correspondingly seemed to de-
pend on the eleven prescriptions, particularly those covering discovery, 
to effectuate inconsistent local procedures.101 Nothing in the statute or 
its legislative history appeared to proscribe these conflicts.102 Of course, 
every court invoked all twelve prescriptions to adopt different proce-
dural permutations.103 
98. Section 473(a) prescribes six principles and guidelines for managing litigation and re-
ducing expense and delay: creation of a system for tailoring case management to meet the unique 
circumstances of each case, early judicial involvement to. establish timelines, discovery confer-
ences, voluntary and cooperative discovery, strict limits on discovery motions, and increased use of 
ADR. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 473(b) provides five litigation 
management and cost and delay reduction techniques: requirements for parties' joint development 
of discovery case management plans, for party representation at pretrial conferences by counsel 
with authority to bind parties regarding matters previously designated by the court, that requests 
for extensions of discovery completion deadlines and for trial postponement be signed by attorneys 
and litigants so requesting, for neutral evaluation programs, and that party representatives with 
authority to bind them in settlement discussions be present or available by telephone during settle-
ment conferences. Id. § 473(b). 
99. See, e.g., § 473(a)(4)-(6), (b)(l), (4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
100. In formulating a plan, the court "shall consider and may include ... such other fea-
tures as the district court considers appropriate after considering the recommendations of the 
advisory group .... " 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(!1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
IOI. See U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EX-
PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9 (1991) (forcefully asserting local prerogatives by declaring 
that "[t]o the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, the 
Plan has precedence and is controlling"); see also Tobias, supra note 29, at 1417, 1421 (providing 
examples of apparent reliance on last proviso); id. at 1416 (providing examples of dependence on 
eleven prescriptions). 
102. See Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1447-49 (1994). See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 438-
39 (Sth ed. 1994); A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 877, 888-94 (1993). 
103. Many judges have inconsistently interpreted the new local procedures, and some have 
not even applied certain provisions that their districts adopted. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 
1621-22. Moreover, numerous lawyers and litigants have encountered difficulty finding, under-
standing and complying with the applicable requirements. One important reason for this is that 
procedures may be part of plans, local rules, individual-judge procedures, orders or informal prac-
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The CJRA, as passed, written and implemented, therefore, clearly 
illustrates many of Professor Yeazell's major ideas. Perhaps most criti-
cal, the above descriptive analysis compellingly reaffirms his central 
thesis that the legislation extends an essential element of the 1938 
Rules: the "dominance of control by the court of original jurisdic-
tion. "104 The evaluation specifically shows that the Act's provision for 
enhanced judicial discretion to manage the increasingly emphasized 
pretrial, through the adoption of local procedures, particularly inconsis-
tent ones, facilitated authority's extension. 
Congress entrusted practically all aspects of statutory effectuation 
to the essentially unreviewable, nearly absolute discretion of courts of 
the first instance.10is The districts had and exercised effectively unfet-
tered discretion to select advisory group members, to consider those 
groups' reports and suggestions and the CJRA's prescribed measures, 
to adopt local requirements governing virtually any procedural area, 
even those already covered in the Federal Rules or the United States 
Code, and to apply those procedures.108 
The statutorily-authorized provisions and the procedures which the 
courts actually implemented expanded district judges' discretion to 
manage pretrial while enlarging the emphasis on that process. For ex-
tices, some of which are easily accessible only to local attorneys and parties. For example, a few 
districts never reduced to written form applicable automatic disclosure procedures, leaving resolu-
tion to local practices or understandings. See id. at 1618 n.188. 
In fairness, the CJRA and its implementation had numerous positive features. Congress 
structured the Act in certain ways that should have limited disuniformity, cost and delay, while 
numerous districts instituted procedures that may save expense or time. Some problems might 
have been attributed more to courts' interpretation and effectuation than to the legislation's lan-
guage. For instance, Congress may have considered the twelfth procedural prescription a narrower 
grant of authority than a number of judges did. See id. at 1619. Moreover, should the CJRA 
sunset in 1997 as scheduled, district courts will retain little of that power which the Act accorded 
them. See also infra notes 165, 192-93 and accompanying text. 
104. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672. 
105. These exercises of discretion were effectively unreviewable. The statute failed to pro-
vide for judicial review, and I am aware of very few direct challenges to courts' exercise of author- . 
ity under the legislation, even to the adoption of inconsistent procedures. See Edwin J. Wesely, 
The Civil Justice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; The Amended Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps What?, 154 F.RD. 563, 570-72 (1994). The 
CJRA, therefore, increases local power by decreasing appellate review of district court decision-
making. See also supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
106. It is important to emphasize, as Professor Y eazell states, that the CJRA places consid-
erable responsibility in local districts for making the procedures. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 
672. It is equally significant to appreciate that the statute may only effect a minor extension of 
developments that local procedural proliferation had already begun. See supra notes 39-40, 58-71 
and accompanying text. 
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ample, many districts exercised increased discretion, particularly to 
control pretrial, by requiring that lawyers and litigants participate in 
additional activities, such as pretrial conferences, or prepare more pa-
pers, such as specialized discovery plans, while enhancing opportunities 
for district court decisionmaking before trial.1°7 Because the CJRA ex-
pressly encouraged local experimentation, and numerous districts ap-
parently treated certain of the Act's eleven provisions and the twelfth 
open-ended prescriptions as implicit invitations to adopt inconsistent re-
quirements, local proliferation served as an important vehicle for au-
thority's accumulation in courts of original jurisdiction.108 
The CJRA and its effectuation accordingly reduced the 1988 JIA 
to considerably less than a counter-reformation and made it analogous 
to an aborted minor rebellion which only temporarily and minimally 
disrupted power's accretion in courts of the first instance. The 1990 
legislation has clearly fostered the accumulation of additional authority 
in courts of original jurisdiction and has probably facilitated that 
power's consolidation. Even those local procedures which achieved the 
statute's goal of decreasing cost or delay might well have enhanced this 
authority at the expense of uniformity or important process values, 
such as fairness or court access.109 Professor Y eazell accurately ob-
served that the Act is "not the Council of Trent, but the rise of the 
Anabaptists, not a counter-reformation but the deepening of Protes-
tantism."110 Indeed, the legislation, by according district courts author-
107. See Tobias, supra note 28, at 1414, 1418-22. 
108. It bears reiteration that the statute facilitated power's accretion by creating institu-
tions and assigning them duties which fostered this shift and which effectively suspended the ini-
tiatives prescribed by the 1988 Act. An additional example is that the composition and instruc-
tions of monitoring entities, namely circuit review committees, made them justifiably reluctant to 
scrutinize procedures that districts adopted under the CJRA. See id. at 1406-13. Correspondingly, 
the circuit judicial councils were probably unwilling to discharge the 1988 Act's broader responsi-
bility to review and alter inconsistent local procedures which the 1990 CJRA apparently author-
ized districts to adopt. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1618-22. See also supra note 95. 
The CJRA also exemplifies the shift of public authority into the private realm. Several statu-
torily-prescribed procedures and a number of measures that districts in· fact effectuated trans-
ferred some public power into the hands of private attorneys. See supra note 99 and accompany-
ing text. 
109. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1623-27; Tobias, supra note 29, at 1423-27. See also 
infra notes 141-62 and accompanying text. 
110. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 672. Professor Yeazell chides Professor Mullenix for 
denominating the CJRA a "counter-reformation" that reversed a trend in the 1983 Rules. Both 
may be correct in certain ways, and their apparent disagreements primarily involve the impreci-
sion of analogies derived from history. Professor Mullenix suggests that the CJRA departed from 
the national, uniform aspect of the 1938 procedural system, which had departed in turn from the 
technicality and rigidity inherent in earlier procedural schemes and the Conformity Act, while she 
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ity to create as well as implement applicable procedures, enhances this 
power. Most significantly, the Act expressly treats the increase as an 
affirmative good. 
The passage of the CJRA, the statute's requirements, and its ef-
fectuation afford striking examples of other phenomena, such as proce-
dural connectedness and mutability and the law of unintended conse-
quences, that are important to Professor Yeazell's essay. The 
institutions created, the experimentation with local measures en-
couraged, and the procedural tenets promoted by the Act reflect little 
apparent attention to potential conflicts with related entities, measures 
and precepts, which Congress had prescribed a mere two years earlier. 
It is not surprising that numerous features of the 1990 CJRA are in-
consistent, and irreconcilable, with the 1988 JIA. 
The 1990 statute's goal of reducing expense and delay by fostering 
local experimentation with innovative procedures inexorably led to the 
proliferation of local procedures, some of which were conflicting, and 
jeopardized the 1988 JIA's purpose of limiting both proliferation and 
inconsistency.111 Those cost and delay reduction objectives correspond-
ingly have direct antecedents in several 1938 procedural tenets that the 
1983 Federal Rules revisions were meant to revive, while the expense 
and delay which the 1990 Act is intended to decrease are partly attrib-
utable to the 1938 Rules' uniform system that the 1988 JIA attempted 
to reinvigorate. 
Additional dimensions of the statute concomitantly evidence lim-
ited ability to view process very broadly, much less systemically. For 
instance, the CJRA's enactment ostensibly evinces great legislative 
concern about delay in civil cases, even though time to disposition in 
the federal courts had remained comparatively constant over the pre-
ceding twenty years.112 In passing the Act, Congress seemed to ignore 
the criminal justice system which profoundly influences the time and 
was not addressing power's accretion. See Mullenix, supra note 90. Professor Yeazell apparently 
agrees with much of that part of her treatment. For example, he characterizes the CJRA, "which 
abandons uniformity [as] the procedural equivalent of Luther's Ninety Five Theses" analogizing 
it to Protestantism, which stood for a "diversity of practices according to the individual con-
science," while he states that the "Rules Enabling Act, with its hierarchically dictated uniform-
ity" represented the old regime, analogizing it and the 1938 Rules to the Catholic Church which 
"stood for uniformity in doctrine and practice." See Yeazell, supra note I, at 672 n.134. See also 
supra notes 32, 71. 
111. Insofar as the 1990 statute effectively suspended initiatives aimed at reducing local 
proliferation and inconsistency which Congress instituted a mere two years previously or increased 
cost or delay, the legislation illustrates the law of unintended consequences. 
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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money required to resolve the federal civil docket.113 Professor Y eazell 
aptly summarized the CJRA when he stated that, absent a "more com-
prehensive sense of how process works, we can look forward only to 
blind vacillation between the points of a swinging pendulum as we 
grasp at various 'reforms,' each bringing its own unappreciated second 
order effects."114 
5. The 1993 Federal Rules Amendments: Additional Deepening of 
the Reformation 
The most ambitious set of revisions to the Federal Rules in their 
half-century history became effective on December 1, 1993.1115 Several 
amendments, particularly in conjunction with earlier procedural devel-
opments, such as those involving the 1983 Federal Rules revisions and 
civil justice reform, inform or elaborate much of Professor Yeazell's 
thinking, although he minimally examined the new provisions. I em-
phasize the changes in Rule 11 governing sanctions and Rule 26 pre-
scribing automatic disclosure because they were the most controversial 
modifications and are most relevant to the issues that his essay treated. 
a. Rule 11 
Rule ll's 1993 revision took effect a decade after the major 1983 
amendment, which was intended to curb litigation abuse, such as the 
pursuit of frivolous litigation, by requiring that attorneys and parties 
conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries and by mandating judicial impo-
sition of sanctions.116 The 1983 version, which was the most controver-
sial alteration in the Rules' half-century history, engendered thousands 
of reported opinions, many more unreported decisions, much informal 
activity, and considerable unnecessary and costly satellite litigation. At 
the same time, it seemed to have chilling effects, particularly on re-
source-poor litigants.117 Numerous lawyers and parties seized on the 
provision for strategic benefit or as a means of recouping the expenses 
of suit. 
113. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
114. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 677-78. 
115. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Forms, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) [hereinafter Amendments]. 
116. See id. at 419-20. See also Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 
IND. LJ. No. 171 (1994); supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rule JI and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 
(1988-89); Walker, supra note 52, at 455-59. See also Burbank, supra note 52. 
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This experience with Rule 11 's 1983 revision, therefore, illustrates 
a number of Professor Yeazell's ideas, particularly relating to proce-
dural mutability and connectedness and the law of unintended conse-
quences. For example, the 1993 amendment's principal purpose is the 
correction of complications with the 1983 version, which itself was 
meant to remedy perceived litigation abuses apparently facilitated by 
the 1938 Rules' uniform, simple regime. The 1983 version was over-
used, misused and even abused, and had other unanticipated side ef-
fects, namely satellite litigation.118 
The most important changes in the revised Rule 11 impose a con-
tinuing duty to track and withdraw papers that lose merit, provide a 
safe harbor for parties which modify or retract offending papers 
twenty-one days after notification of infractions, and leave to judicial 
discretion the sanctions that courts levy for rule violations.119 The 1993 
amendment, therefore, retains the 1983 provision's focus on pretrial, 
and even prefiling, conduct of lawyers and litigants, imposing signifi-
cant responsibilities on them, and on judicial control over that behav-
ior.120 The safe harbor's requirement of notice and an opportunity to 
remedy deficiencies within three weeks before parties may file motions 
with the court could correspondingly increase pretrial activities in 
which attorneys and parties must participate while shifting some public 
power into private hands.121 The recent revision, by trusting sanctions 
decisions to district courts, probably enhances their discretion and 
power to manage the early stages of the litigation process.122 
b. Automatic Disclosure 
The amendment of Rule 26(a) instituting automatic disclosure, 
which requires that parties exchange important information about their 
118. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 
77 IOWA L. REV. 1775 (1992); Walker supra note 52, at 455-59. But cf. FED. R. C1v. P. 11 
Advisory Committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983) (admonishing judges about 
potential chilling effects). 
119. See Amendments, supra note 115, 146 F.R.D. at 420-23. See also Tobias, supra note 
118. 
120. The safe harbor reduces somewhat judicial control. See infra note 121 and accompany-
ing text. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
121. For example, movants must prepare notices, while targets must respond to notices, 
possibly by undertaking additional research. See Tobias, supra note 118, at 1785. 
122. Making sanctions discretionary may limit judicial power and control. See supra note 
52. See also Tobias, supra note 25, at 1610 (discussing 1993 Congressional efforts to defer Rule 
ll's effective date); Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Revise Rule 11, 160 F.R.D. 275 
(1995) (discussing 1995 Congressional efforts to amend Rule 11). 
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cases prior to traditional discovery, was the most controversial formal 
proposal to revise the Federal Rules ever developed.123 Nearly all seg-
ments of the organized bar opposed the original proposal which the 
Advisory Committee developed because the critics could not ascertain 
precisely what must be divulged, believed that disclosure would impose 
an additional layer of discovery, thought that the proposal would create 
ethical conflicts with clients, and were concerned that it might increase 
expense and delay.12" 
The Advisory Committee responded to this opposition by with-
drawing the initial proposal in February 1992, but the Committee re-
vived a modified disclosure provision two months later which was ap-
proved by the remaining rule revision entities.125 The United States 
House of Representatives voted to delete automatic disclosure; how-
ever, the Senate unexpectedly failed to act and the disclosure amend-
ment went into effect on December 1, 1993.126 
The aspect of the new Rule which is most relevant to the issues 
that Professor Yeazell treated was the inclusion of a local option mech-
anism, which authorized all ninety-four districts to alter the Federal 
Rule revision or to reject it completely.127 Numerous districts relied on 
this provision to prescribe local disclosure procedures that vary from 
the Federal Rule amendment or to eschew it totally.128 Indeed, a small 
number of courts even left the decision about applying any disclosure 
requirements to the discretion of each judge in the district.129 Fewer 
123. I rely substantially here on Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discov-
ery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal 
Civil Discovery, in 145 F.R.D. 139, 140 (1993); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Re-
form, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1992). 
124. See Amendments, supra note 115, 146 F.R.D. at 512 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bell et 
al., supra note 123, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 123, at 141. 
125. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1612; Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform, 
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6. 
126. See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 139 CONG. REC. H8746-47 (daily ed. 
Nov. 3, 1993). 
127. See Amendments, supra note 115, 146 F.R.D. at 431. See also id. at 427, 437, 478 
(prescribing local option for Rule 16 pretrial conferences, Rule 30 and 33 presumptive limits on 
interrogatories and depositions, and Rule 54 costs); infra note 139 (Rule 16). 
128. See, e.g., E.D. LA. R. 6.06E; D. ME. R. 18(g). See also DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH 
SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (1995); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, Mandatory Discl<r 
sure Rule 26(a)(I): Not The Rule of Choice (1994). 
129. See N.D. ILL. R. 2.04D; U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 
TEXAS, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2-4 (1993). See also John Flynn 
Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, Is "Source of Confusion": Critics, CHI. DAILY L. 
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than fifty districts ultimately chose to adopt the Federal Rule revi-
sion.130 That amendment also permits judges and litigants to change its 
requirements in individual cases.131 
The local option provision is very important because it enlarges the 
power and discretion of courts of original jurisdiction. Most signifi-
cantly~ it entrusts to those courts not only the authority to formulate 
procedures governing an important aspect of the increasingly empha-
sized pretrial process but also empowers districts and individual judges 
to prescribe and apply local measures that conflict with the applicable 
Federal Rule and with requirements in the remaining districts. The lo-
cal option mechanism thus expressly authorizes local procedural 
proliferation and significantly multiplies the possibilities for inconsis-
tency, while it clearly complicates, and may increase cost and delay in, 
federal civil litigation.132 
The provision also illustrates procedural mutability and connected-
ness and the law of unintended consequences. For example, the 1993 
Federal Rules amendments, the first major test of the new federal rule 
revision process which the 1988 JIA prescribed, included requirements 
that exacerbated local proliferation of inconsistent procedures, a signifi-
cant problem at which the statute was specifically directed.133 Concom-
itantly, local option's ostensible purpose was to accommodate CJRA 
experimentation with procedures that would save expense and time, but 
its inclusion has complicated civil practice and probably increased cost 
and delay. 
The profound symbolic importance of the local option provision 
could well eclipse its substantial practical significance. Numerous ob-
servers of federal civil procedure have long considered the Advisory 
Committee to be the "Defender of the Faith" in the national, uniform 
procedural system that the 1938 Rules embodied.134 When the Com-
mittee, apparently for reasons of political expediency or to salvage its 
BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17. 
130. See Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5. See 
also STIENSTRA, supra note 128; Cortese & Blaner, supra note 128; Rooney, supra note 129. 
131. See FED. R. C!v. P. 26(a)(I), Amendments, supra note 115, 146 F.R.D. at 432. 
132. For example, the applicable procedures are difficult to locate, understand and satisfy. 
See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1614. See also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. 
133. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1600-01, 1613-15. See also supra notes 75-79 and ac-
companying text. 
134. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal 
Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LA w & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1988, at 67. 
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flagging influence, acceded to an approach that facilitated power's ac-
cretion by leaving to district judges the adoption of potentially inconsis-
tent procedures covering an important component of the increasingly 
emphasized pretrial, exacerbating disuniformity and complexity, the 
Committee dealt an enormous symbolic, and perhaps mortal, blow to 
the notion of a national uniform code of procedure.185 Borrowing from 
the religious allusions of Professors Mullenix and Y eazell, it was as if 
the Catholic Church had authorized every parish to adopt views on sig-
nificant issues of religious practice, such as contraception, that eff ectu-
ated the individual perspectives of the local parishioners.186 
The disclosure procedure itself illustrates several important con-
cepts proffered by Professor Yeazell. Automatic disclosure facilitates 
power's accumulation by enlarging the emphasis on pretrial and judi-
cial discretion to manage this process as well as increasing the number 
of steps, requirements, and opportunities for district court decisionmak-
ing at that stage, "frontloading" litigation even more. The authoriza-
tion for judicial modification in specific cases enhances trial court 
power and discretion, while the provision for party stipulation and for 
attorneys to meet and confer about disclosure shifts some public au-
thority into private hands.187 The phrasing of the Federal disclosure 
amendment also illustrates the law of unintended consequences. For ex-
ample, the requirement to disclose information "alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings" encourages more specific pleading and thus 
conflicts with notice pleading under Federal Rule 8.188 
c. Rule 16 
The 1993 amendment in Rule 16 specifically authorizes district 
judges to require that a party or its representative attend pretrial con-
ferences or be available by telephone in considering settlement pos-
sibilities, to control discovery's extent and timing and to encourage set-
tlement and the use of special extra-judicial procedures, such as 
ADR.189 These provisions facilitate power's accretion in several ways. 
They enhance judicial discretion to manage pretrial and to require that 
135. I am indebted to Lauren Robel for this idea. 
136. See supra notes 32, 71, 110 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
138. See FED. R C!v. P. 26(a)(l), Amendments, supra note 115, at 431. See generally 
Marcus, supra note 13. 
139. See FED. R C!v. P. 16, Amendments, supra note 115, at 427-31. See also id. at 427 
(including local option provision). 
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lawyers and litigants participate in more activities before trial, increase 
the number of pretrial steps and emphasize this process, and expand 
opportunities in pretrial for judicial decisionmaking, much of which 
will be effectively insulated from appellate review.140 
In sum, the above procedural developments, but especially very re-
cent ones, namely the 1993 amendments and civil justice reform, as 
they elaborate important earlier developments, illustrate many of Pro-
fessor Y eazell's ideas. Most important, they show that enhanced judi-
cial discretion to manage the increasingly emphasized pretrial, made 
possible by local procedural proliferation, has facilitated power's ac-
cumulation in courts of the first instance. 
IV. IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN CIVIL PROCESS 
Professor Y eazell's essay was primarily descriptive, although he 
did identify certain consequences of several procedural phenomena that 
he discussed. For example, Professor Yeazell carefully examined some 
problematic implications of not appreciating and taking into account 
modern civil process' interconnected and mutable character and possi-
ble detrimental effects of procedural change.141 Nonetheless, he ad-
dressed minimally or left untreated other important consequences, prin-
cipally relating to power's concentration in courts of original 
jurisdiction. This section analyzes such ramifications. 
The accumulation in these courts of substantially more authority, 
particularly power that is effectively unreviewable and for which judges 
are essentially unaccountable, is not without consequence; it can signifi-
cantly affect federal court judges, lawyers, and litigants, as well as 
Congress, procedural revision entities, and the civil justice system.142 
Perhaps most important, authority's accretion places enormous trust in 
the judgement of a single individual and enlarges considerably the 
great power of the state, which federal judges exercise.143 
140. The authorization to encourage settlement and the use of special extra-judicial proce· 
dures could shift some public power into private bands. See supra note 138 and accompanying 
text. The most recent manifestation of the procedural phenomena examined above is the ninth 
tenet of the "Contract With America." See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Re-
forms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 {1995). 
141. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 631-32, 676-78. I rely substantially here on Tobias, supra 
note 29, at 1422-27. 
142. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 29, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 25, at 1625-32. 
143. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court. 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 {1983). See also Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Images of Justice, 
96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987). 
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The invocation of increased authority, and, indeed, its very exis-
tence, can benefit attorneys and parties that possess economic or politi-
cal power, are "repeat players" or are located in a specific district and 
advantage courts of the first instance vis-a-vis nearly all other individu-
als and institutions.144 Courts of original jurisdiction may employ and 
even abuse their enlarged authority, especially to manage the pretrial 
process which local procedural proliferation frequently facilitates, in 
numerous ways that unfairly disadvantage certain counsel and litigants. 
Professor Yeazell included a trenchant illustration of how district 
judges can exercise this enhanced power in the pretrial phase to control 
and attempt to terminate civil disputes by, for instance, coercing settle-
ments from unwilling litigants and parties.145 
The accumulation of authority, made possible by the increasing 
emphasis on pretrial, the ever-growing number of steps in that stage, 
the mounting requirements for drafting, filing and signing papers and 
for participating in conferences during the phase,146 and the expanded 
judicial decisionmaking necessitated at this juncture,147 most detrimen-
tally affects those attorneys and litigants who have the least financial 
and political power. An obvious example of these propositions is that 
the need to research and craft the documents and to be involved in the 
144. These assertions are subject to several caveats, such as the ideas that the authority's 
exercise can vary considerably among districts, individual judges and case types and may depend 
substantially on factors, such as judges' political perspectives and temperament. See Tobias, supra 
note 29, at 1424. See also Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing repeat players). I also 
appreciate that the contention may seem crudely instrumental, although a recent study in the 
context of employment discrimination litigation showed that some judges have applied procedures 
in ways that disadvantaged and even disproportionately affected plaintiffs. See Phyllis Trapper 
Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and 
Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992). 
145. See Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987). See also Yeazell, supra note l, 
at 657-59. The power's exercise was particularly blatant in Lockhart, and it was invoked against 
an insurance company. The power's exercise frequently is more subtle, and it is invoked considera-
bly more often against lawyers and parties with less power and resources. See, e.g., Strandell v. 
Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Human Re-
sources, 789 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Baumann et al., supra note 143. 
146. It is important to remember that certain of these requirements elaborate or comple-
ment the already substantial demands, such as those in Rules 11, 16, and 26. See supra notes 49-
57, 116-40 and accompanying text. 
147. The increased demands imposed on courts during pretrial have adversely affected fed-
eral judges. For instance, courts' responsibilities to preside over a greater number, and broader 
variety, of litigation conferences, many of which are increasingly complicated, and to make more 
decisions consume scarce judicial resources and limit their discharge of other duties. See Tobias, 
supra note 29, at 1423. 
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activities additionally strains the lawyers' and parties' already scarce 
resources while complicating their efforts to prove cases, reach trial and 
conclude suits.148 
The concentration in district courts of authority, especially as en-
couraged by growing judicial discretion which the original Federal 
Rules and many amendments since 1938 have bestowed, has similarly 
affected attorneys and parties with few resources or minimal political 
influence. Judicial discretion is an instrument of power whose exercise 
generally has the most deleterious effects on these lawyers and liti-
gants.149 For instance, courts can employ the vast discretion invested in 
them by numerous Federal Rules to demand that these attorneys and 
parties submit papers or participate in conferences or in ADR which 
can further drain their limited time, money, and energy and make liti-
gation's pursuit more complex.1150 
The accretion in courts of original jurisdiction of authority, partic-
ularly as facilitated by local procedural proliferation, has had other sig-
nificant pragmatic effects, namely the additional complication of fed-
eral civil practice. For example, the local proliferation which the 
CJRA's implementation exemplifies and compounds, has made it more 
difficult for all lawyers and parties, but especially those who have little 
money or power or are located outside a particular district, to find, 
understand, and comply with local requirements. A number of these 
requirements, as written or applied, have specifically disadvantaged 
these counsel and litigants.1151 
The accumulation of power has also been important to the phe-
nomenon of contracting procedural opportunities. These shrinking pos-
sibilities are illustrated by the imposition of numerical limitations on 
interrogatories and depositions, 1152 which disproportionately affect par-
ties who lack resources or access to material that is relevant to their 
cases because they need greater discovery to secure this information.1153 
Many district judges informally employ the enhanced authority, 
148. The enhanced emphasis on pretrial and the deemphasis of trials can detrimentally af-
fect certain lawyers and litigants, who pursue, for example, personal injury or job discrimination 
litigation because they are more likely to succeed before juries in trials. See generally Baumann et 
al., supra note 144. 
149. See Burbank, supra note 36, at 1470. 
150. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 1422-27. See also Tobias, supra note 25, at 1623-24. 
151. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 1422-27; Tobias, supra note 25, at 1614-15. 
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 33(a), Amendments, supra note 115, 146 F.R.D. at 449, 
461. 
153. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 29, at 1424; Tobias, supra note 117, at 495-96. 
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especially when managing pretrial, while much of that and numerous 
additional exercises of power escape appellate scrutiny. This authority's 
application can adversely affect all attorneys and litigants, although its 
invocation most disadvantages those lawyers and parties who possess 
limited resources and power, chilling their enthusiasm, as they have 
little ability to resist the authority's imposition. Much described above 
correspondingly means that public interest organizations, such as the 
NAACP or the Natural Resources Defense Council, which litigate in 
multiple districts, encounter considerable difficulty vindicating rights 
and interests in the Constitution and congressional statutes.1154 
Courts exercising this increased power can invoke it at the expense 
of Congress, thereby eroding legislative branch authority.11515 For in-
stance, when federal districts or individual judges adopt local proce-
dures that conflict with Federal Rules or provisions in the United 
States Code, the local strictures undermine those national requirements 
and bypass the congressional review prescribed for Federal Rules revi-
sion in the Rules Enabling Act.1156 Insofar as district judges promul-
gate, interpret or apply local procedural provisions in ways which im-
properly discourage attorneys and parties, such as civil rights plaintiffs, 
whose vigorous pursuit of litigation Congress specifically admonished 
courts to facilitate in substantive, procedural and fee-shifting statutes, 
that judicial activity correspondingly frustrates legislative intent and 
enhances judicial power vis-a-vis congressional authority.1157 
Power's accretion, particularly as fostered by local procedural 
proliferation, has had deleterious institutional effects, diminishing the 
authority and prestige, while undercutting the efforts, of national rule 
revision entities such as the Advisory Committee.1158 These institutions 
have generally trained their substantial expertise and system-wide 
154. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 29, at 1423. See also Tobias, supra note 117, at 495-98. 
155. See Tobias, supra note 49, at 961-63 (describing and criticizing judicial application of 
the 1983 amendment to Rule 11). 
156. To the extent that district judges rely on the 1990 CJRA to adopt inconsistent local 
procedures, this frustrates legislative intent in the 1988 JIA to limit inconsistent local procedures 
and violates Rule 83's prohibition on inconsistency. Nonetheless, judges have honored these in the 
breach, and the 1990 statute seems to authorize inconsistency. See supra notes 26-29, 39-40, 59-
71, 75-79, 100·03, 106-08 and accompanying text. 
157. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 1425. The activity also undermines the statutory benefi-
ciaries' vindication of substantive rights. See id. See also supra notes 142-54 and accompanying 
text. 
158. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking: Factional 
Politics is Jeopardizing the Federal Rulemaking Process, 15 JUDICATURE 161 (1991). See also 
Tobias, supra note 29, at 1426. 
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viewpoint on the preservation, maintenance and improvement of a na-
tional, uniform procedural scheme, have developed Federal Rules 
amendments that are best for all ninety-four districts and have afforded 
some check on district judges' exercise of excessive or abusive power, 
particularly when prescribing and applying local requirements. 1119 Fed-
eral civil procedure's increased locafization, by instituting a procedural 
regime that is based on less expertise and is more provincial and by 
decreasing the perceived need for Federal rule revision, has apparently 
limited the national revisors' influence and even called into question 
their relevance.160 
Power's accumulation in courts of original jurisdiction, particu-
larly that promoted by greater judicial discretion to control the increas-
ingly emphasized pretrial, has adversely affected the civil justice sys-
tem. The earlier procedural developments, such as expanded 
managerial judging, especially as elaborated by the CJRA's implemen-
tation-requiring that lawyers and parties produce more papers and 
participate in more activities, multiplying litigation's steps, and enlarg-
ing ADR's significance-arguably complicate efforts to discern the 
truth and to reach lawsuits' merits while reducing the quality of justice 
attained.161 Respect for the civil litigation process declines when the 
public thinks that the procedures available or the nature of justice can 
vary significantly in specific districts, that the character of justice re-
flects cases' size or subject matter, that attorneys' or parties' resources 
affect justice's quality, or that complexities or technicalities prevent or 
frustrate the vindication of rights.162 
159. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 134; Tobias, supra note 49, at 961-63. 
160. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 90; Tobias, supra note 29, at 1426. 
161. Indeed, the consummate irony of these earlier procedural developments, as adum-
brated by the CJRA's effectuation is that they will probably have impacts quite different from 
ones which Congress envisioned: they could well foster enhanced delay and cost in civil litigation, 
reduced federal court access, fewer equitable dispositions, and less merits-based resolutions. See 
Tobias, supra note 29, at 1426-27. See also supra notes 85-86, 93, 96-98 and accompanying text. 
162. See Tobias, supra note 29, at 1427. The shift of former public authority into private 
hands has had certain effects that resemble those ascribed to the accumulation of power in courts 
of the first instance. The transfer of authority has generally provided advantages to lawyers and 
litigants who have superior resources, are repeat players, or are local. Conversely, this transfer has 
disadvantaged those without these attributes. More specifically, procedures that encourage or 
command participation in private forms of ADR minimally burden lawyers and litigants with 
significant resources and power, while at the same time pressuring resource-poor litigants into 
participating, and thus incurring expenditure of limited time, money and energy. See also supra 
notes 142-54 and accompanying text. 
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Professor Yeazell afforded an account of modern civil process 
which was considerably more descriptive than prescriptive, although he 
provided valuable general suggestions for seeing that process and al-
luded to some specific recommendations. I am less constrained and, in-
deed, I feel obligated to prescribe. This section initially proposes a 
modest approach, primarily implicating the most immediate aspects of 
civil process, which could be instituted in the near future. This section 
then explores potential solutions that might be implemented in the long 
term.163 
The second and third parts of this response showed how earlier 
procedural developments, which managerial judging exemplifies, as 
augmented by quite recent ones, namely the CJRA's implementation 
that local procedural proliferation facilitates, place too much unreview-
able power in courts of original jurisdiction, while the fourth section 
explained why this authority should be restricted. This article recog-
nizes that the power could be reduced in numerous ways, such as en-
hancing appellate court scrutiny of its exercise, decreasing judicial dis-
cretion to manage pretrial, or deemphasizing that process. 
A helpful initial step would be to limit somewhat the authority of 
courts of the first instance by restoring and maintaining the primacy of 
a national, uniform system of civil procedure. This approach may gen-
erally be realized by capitalizing on the best, and eliminating or ame-
liorating the least desirable, features of the 1988 JIA and the 1990 
CJRA and their implementation, including those 1993 Federal Rules 
revisions which involved civil justice reform, most notably provision for 
local option and automatic disclosure.164 
It remains rather early to posit very definitive conclusions about 
experimentation under the CJRA, because comparatively conclusive 
determinations must await the rigorous evaluation of the reform's effec-
tuation, particularly the efficacy of those procedures that judges imple-
mented. Nonetheless, the experimentation and assessment which have 
163. I am all too aware of the difficulty of formulating comprehensive recommendations, for 
reasons so ably articulated by Professor Yeazell. Moreover, certain practical realities, such as the 
likelihood of judicial resistance to limiting power and of congressional resistance to change pend-
ing evaluation of CJRA experimentation, frustrate efforts to enunciate very ambitious proposals. 
Thus, while the task is daunting, the problems with modern civil process are sufficiently serious to 
warrant positing some suggestions. I attempt to identify and account for the effects that these 
recommendations will have. 
164. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1627-34. See also supra notes 72-140 and accompanying 
text. 
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been performed thus far suggest that Congress should allow the Act to 
sunset as scheduled in 1997 .165 • 
Those mechanisms which proved very effective in reducing expense 
or delay and which comport with other important process values, such 
as uniformity, simplicity and open court access, must receive nation-
wide application by including them in the Federal Rules.166 The mea-
sures that appeared promising, but were insufficiently efficacious to jus-
tify national implementation, should be designated for additional, 
selective testing with a process modeled on a 1991 proposed amend-
ment to Rule 83 which was reportedly retracted in deference to civil 
justice reform experimentation.167 District judges correspondingly 
ought to abrogate less effective procedures, especially mechanisms that 
conflict with the Federal Rules or the United States Code. 
Illustrative of these propositions are the provisions for local option 
and automatic disclosure. These provisions have seriously undermined 
national uniformity, created considerable confusion, and imposed in-
creased cost and delay.168 The ongoing application of various disclosure 
techniques might indicate that one is particularly efficacious, and the 
measure should then be embodied in a Federal Rule.169 
This approach also effectively prescribes reattainment of the 1988 
procedural status quo and the systematic implementation of the 1988 
JIA's provisions through which Congress intended to restore the pri-
165. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1629-30. See also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 
28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1993) (Implementation of Plans, § 103(b)(2)); see infra notes 193-94 and 
accompanying text. 
166. It now appears that certain procedures in the broad areas of case management, ADR 
and discovery will be most efficacious. See also Burbank, supra note 36, at 1466-71 (discussing 
process values); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1993) (Pilot Pro-
gram, § 105(c)) (prescribing approach for pilot districts similar to that in text). 
167. The proposal authorized districts with Judicial Conference approval to adopt for not 
greater than five years experimental local rules which contravene Federal Rules. See Judicial 
Conference of the U.S. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of 
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil' Procedure 83, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 152-54 
(1991). See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1633. The Supreme Court recently adopted an amendment 
to Rule 83 which will take effect in December, 1995, unless Congress modifies it. The amendment 
proscribes local rules that are "duplicative of Acts of Congress" or the Federal Rules. It also 
prohibits the imposition of sanctions for "noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, 
federal rule, or the local district rules, unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the partic-
ular case with actual notice of the requirement." Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Amendments 
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 160 F.R.D. 149, 152 (1995). 
168. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying text. 
169. I realize that ongoing application is proceeding under both the CJRA and the 1993 
Federal Rule amendment; however, they are sufficiently intertwined to justify using disclosure 
here. See supra notes 102, 123-38 and accompanying text. 
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macy of national, uniform procedure; to open the Federal Rules 
amendment process; and to regularize and open local procedural revi-
sion while limiting local procedural proliferation. The effectuation of 
the 1988 statute's elements, especially governing local procedure, which 
the 1990 Act's implementation essentially suspended, and the above-
suggested resolution of CJRA experimentation could decrease consider-
ably the accretion of power ascribed to local proliferation, reduce some-
what authority's accumulation attributed to increased judicial discre-
tion and even limit power's growth resulting from greater emphasis on 
managerial judging and pretrial. 
The course of action proposed might have certain disadvantageous 
effects. For instance, the recommendations may circumscribe the flexi-
bility of district courts and individual judges to apply procedures that 
treat peculiar, problematic local conditions, including expense and de-
lay, or restrict trial court discretion to punish litigation abuse. How-
ever, Rule 83's proposed amendment, which would authorize measured 
experimentation with inconsistent, innovative mechanisms for improv-
ing federal civil procedure, should be responsive to these concerns.170 
Implementation of the JIA's commands relating to local procedural 
proliferation might prove costly and, indeed, expense was one impor-
tant reason for the mandates' limited effectuation.171 Systematizing and 
opening the local procedural amendment processes could additionally 
politicize them and, therefore, effectively replicate complications, such 
as local favoritism, which accompanied CJRA experimentation.172 
These possible detrimental impacts, most of which are comparatively 
minor or can be ameliorated, seem less significant than the need to 
curtail "excessive" judicial authority.173 
This approach is also rather limited. For example, it treats some-
what less systematically other phenomena, namely enlarged judicial 
170. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Courts could also invoke their substantial 
inherent authority. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 42-51 (1991). 
171. Telephone Interviews with Andrew Tietz, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit (July 20, 1994); David Pimentel, Assistant Circuit Executive, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (July 22, 1994) See also Carl Tobias, Suggestions for 
Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1995). 
172. See supra note 95; cf. Mullenix, supra note 134 (making similar arguments regarding 
national rule revision); see also Tobias, supra note 29, at 1404-06; supra notes 77, 79 and accom-
panying text. 
173. For example, the loss of flexibility will be small and can be ameliorated. See supra 
note 167 and accompanying text. The cost of limiting inconsistent local procedures is correspond-
ingly minor and can be minimized by employing volunteer assistance of the bar or law professors. 
See Telephone Interviews with Andrew Tietz and David Pimentel, supra note 171. 
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discretion and increased emphasis on pretrial and managerial judging, 
that have been important to authority's accretion. The basic, structural, 
and even entrenched nature of the phenomena and the complications, 
such as probable judicial resistance, in realizing more meaningful mod-
ification suggest that broader reform should await the institution of the 
preposed initial step. The fact that every major development in modern 
civil process, except for the 1988 JIA, underlay those phenomena at-
tests to their engrained quality, the considerable difficulty of securing 
greater change, and the propriety of caution. Indeed, current civil pro-
cedure could well be so fragmented that it is preferable to seek a modi-
cum of stability before undertaking more complex tasks.174 
Professor Y eazell so persuasively articulated the problems of fash-
ioning systemic solutions for the complications of modern civil process 
that it is advisable to move outside the ordinary channels which modify 
procedure. For example, he ·accurately asserted that unselfconscious 
tinkering, in the form of a "series of incremental changes in trial court 
procedures, each defensible and sensible in itself," by the national rule 
revisors and by Congress in the 1990 legislation contributed to process' 
present condition.1111 These institutions are precisely the ones that 
would be central participants in any effort to alter procedure through 
the normal modification mechanisms. 
It appears better, therefore, to create an entity, such as a national 
commission on civil procedure, which could embark upon the type of 
extensive study and painstaking work of developing solutions that Pro-
fessor Yeazell suggested was indicated.176 This entity must have the 
requisite resources, independence and expertise to collect, analyze and 
synthesize those data which are responsive to the questions that he 
raised. 
The commission should rely substantially on much helpful mate-
rial which has recently been assembled. An invaluable source will be 
the wealth of information that is compiled and assessed in the unprece-
dented nationwide experimentation that is proceeding pursuant to the 
CJRA. Additional promising sources could be the 1990 report of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee177 and the insights gleaned from the 
174. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 90; Robel, supra note 101; see also Tobias, supra note 
25, at 1614 & n.168 (alluding to several calls for moratoria on reform). 
175. Yeazell, supra note 1, at 677. See also Tobias, supra note 25, at 1602-05, 1623-28 
(1990 legislation); supra notes 83-114 and accompanying text. 
176. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 102, at 900; Tobias, supra note 25, at 1627 & n.228. The 
guidance that follows is rather theoretical and selective. See also infra note 188. 
177. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COl\fl\flITEE (1990); see also supra note 86 
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1988 JIA's implementation.178 The commission may also want to 
gather and evaluate considerable new data.179 
The most important issue which the commission should attempt to 
resolve is whether courts of original jurisdiction now possess too much 
power. If the entity determines that this authority is excessive, it should 
evaluate civil process as a whole and craft solutions which have varying 
degrees of specificity while identifying and accounting for the reforms' 
effects. Assuming arguendo that the commission finds the power too 
substantial, this body could develop proposals which would directly 
limit district judges' authority. For instance, increased circuit court re-
view of the power's invocation may restrict it, although such scrutiny 
would additionally burden appellate judges.180 
The entity might correspondingly formulate solutions which treat 
those particular phenomena, namely enhanced judicial discretion, local 
procedural proliferation, and greater emphases on pretrial and manage-
rial judging, that have facilitated authority's accretion. For example, 
the systemic nature of judicial discretion, which pervades much of 
modern civil process and many Federal Rules, makes it an unlikely 
prospect for thorough modification but a possible candidate for incre-
mental change.181 The growing emphasis on managerial judging and 
local procedural proliferation concomitantly seem narrower. After all, 
managerial judging is principally a style of judging. The adoption of 
inconsistent local rules, if not individual-judge procedures, is a compar-
atively discrete problem whose routinization was promoted by CJRA 
experimentation and therefore probably made more amenable to ame-
lioration.182 Nevertheless, both managerial judging and local prolifera-
and accompanying text. 
178. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1604-07; see also id. at 1621-24 (1990 CJRA effectively 
suspended much of 1988 JIA's implementation aimed at local proliferation). 
179. See also Tobias, supra note 25, at 1633 (providing other helpful sources); infra notes 
186-88 and accompanying text (same). 
180. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 639-40. I could posit additional, general suggestions 
which would directly limit power. Those, and even more specific, recommendations may depend 
substantially on what the commission finds and, in any event, should probably await tbe conclu-
sion of CJRA experimentation. See supra note 163. 
181. The 1966 party joinder amendments and the 1983 revisions in Rules 11, 16 and 26 are 
illustrative but not unusual. See supra notes 36, 49-57 and accompanying text. See also infra note 
195 and accompanying text (suggesting rule revisors consider discretion in drafting new propos-
als). The emphasized pretrial is also an unlikely prospect for thorough modification, because, for 
instance, it seems to be an important structural component of the Federal Rules. 
182. CJRA experimentation clarified tbe critical nature of inconsistency while exacerbating 
it. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1623-27; Tobias, supra note 29, at 1422-27. Local proliferation 
can be rectified or ameliorated, if the CJRA sunsets and the JIA and Rule 83 are properly imple-
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tion remain rather ubiquitous and difficult to address comprehensively, 
because, for instance, numerous districts and many specific judges 
practice managerial judging and apply inconsistent local requirements, 
especially under the rubric of civil justice reform.183 
The four procedural phenomena can also be viewed in the context 
of specific procedural requirements. Federal Rule 16, governing pretrial 
conferences, is illustrative.184 The provision's revision could limit 
power's accumulation by restricting local proliferation and judicial dis-
cretion and by deemphasizing managerial judging and the pretrial pro-
cess, even as these changes might sacrifice courts' flexibility to handle 
litigation abuse and to fashion procedures for saving expense and time 
during pretrial. 1811 
The commission as well could consult the thinking of several pro-
cedure scholars to which Professor Y eazell alluded and the efforts of 
numerous judges and many writers who have participated in lively de-
bate and have formulated suggestions regarding the best twenty-first 
century process.188 For instance, Professor Stephen Subrin developed a 
provocative proposal for better integrating substance and procedure 
which might treat important concerns, such as increasing judicial dis-
cretion and enhanced emphasis on pretrial.187 Professor Judith Resnik 
championed the adoption of a second set of Federal Rules for complex 
cases, a recommendation which could limit somewhat local procedural 
proliferation and courts' discretion to manage pretrial.188 
mented. See supra notes 26-29, 72-83, 165 and accompanying text. 
183. Numerous judges will resist changes relating to managerial judging and local proce-
dural proliferation, although a number will not because the judges rely minimally on them. Imple-
mentation of the strictures on local proliferation in Rule 83 and the JIA should generally limit 
proliferation, although they may restrict judicial flexibility. But cf. supra note 167 and accompa-
nying text (providing proposal to amend Rule 83 that balances need to treat proliferation with 
need for flexibility). 
184. Rule 16 would also be a good candidate for treatment in the normal rule revision 
process. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. 
185. For example, elimination of the local option provision in Rule 16 would limit prolifera-
tion and judicial discretion. See also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 
16's 1993 amendment); supra notes 168-69, infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing 
local option). See generally Keeton, supra note 82. 
186. A valuable starting point is the work of all of the scholars mentioned in the last section 
of Professor Yeazell's essay. Particularly active federal judges include Judge Richard Posner, 
Judge Ralph Winter, Judge Robert Parker, and Judge William Schwarzer. 
187. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case 
for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 5 (1994). 
188. See Judith Resnik, Comments on Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (1991) (copy on file with author). Were the Advisory Committee to 
implement that recommendation, the Committee might recapture the procedural initiative and 
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If a commission is not created, those institutions, including Con-
gress and national and local rule revisors, such as the Advisory Com-
mittee, federal districts and individual judges, that participate in future 
procedural policymaking, should implement the above prescriptions, 
when applicable, and be attentive to Professor Y eazell's admonitions. 
These decisionmakers should generally attempt to delineate and take 
into account proposed changes' effects on modern process and on im-
portant specific considerations, such as judicial power and discretion, 
expense and delay, and court access, while subjecting all proposals de-
veloped to public scrutiny.189 
Relatively broad, structural, and entrenched procedural poli-
cymaking involving, for instance, authority's accumulation, seems pecu-
liarly appropriate for congressional treatment, although it will also im-
plicate delicate interbranch relationships typified by court 
rulemaking.190 When Congress envisions procedural modification of 
that or any significant magnitude, therefore, it should closely consult 
with the federal judiciary whose insight and cooperation will be crucial 
to the success of every procedural change initiated.191 The national rule 
revisors should be cognizant of their historical propensity to fix or ame-
liorate narrow problems, especially involving particular Rules, rather 
than to view civil procedure comprehensively, much less to see process 
systemically .192 
improve its somewhat tarnished reputation. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. But 
see infra note 192. 
This guidance is deliberately meant to be selective rather than to provide a comprehensive 
roadmap implicating modem civil procedure, or process. Moreover, much may depend on the re-
sults of a commission's work and the indicated responses and on what CJRA experimentation 
shows. Congress is also unlikely to create a commission, until it secures the results of CJRA 
experimentation. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
189. The decisionmakers, in making broad procedural policy or narrower determinations 
involving, for instance, specific Federal Rules, should apply a finely-calibrated analysis which 
clearly identifies, considers, and balances, when indicated, the maximum number of relevant con-
siderations. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1592 n.13, 1629 n.237. 
190. See Mullenix, supra note 90, at 379-82, 399-400; Tobias, supra note 25, at 1625. 
191. For example, if Congress found district court authority excessive and considered limit-
ing it or decided to treat the four procedural phenomena that have facilitated power's accretion, 
consultation with the federal judiciary would be essential. See also supra notes 84-91 and accom-
panying text (recounting instructive experience with CJRA's passage). 
192. See, e.g., Harold Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons 
for Civil Rules Revision, 85 ·MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987); Marcus, supra note 13, at 494; Carl 
Tobias, Amending the Other Party Joinder Amendments, 139 F.R.D. 519 (1992). Cf. Tobias, 
supra note 25, at 1595 n.30, 1632 n.253 (suggesting need for empirical data on experimentation 
with proposals for improving Federal Rules). See also supra note 175 and accompanying text. In 
fairness, the Advisory Committee has recently addressed broader topics, such as sanctions, while 
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More specific guidance can be afforded. For example, Congress 
ought to decide whether the CJRA will sunset by remembering that 
the Act and statutory effectuation enlarged the authority of courts of 
original jurisdiction, encouraged local procedural proliferation, and en-
hanced judicial discretion, especially with regard to the management of 
the additionally emphasized pretrial.193 Congress should keep in mind 
that the accretion of power and local proliferation fostered by the 
CJRA's implementation eroded legislative branch authority, that pro-
liferating inconsistent procedures frustrate a major purpose of the 1988 
JIA, and that the 1990 and 1988 statutes need to be harmonized.194 
When the Advisory Committee formulates, and other rule revision 
entities review, proposals for amending Federal Rules, they should be 
alert to power's accumulation and to the four phenomena responsible 
for accretion. For instance, the Advisory Committee might attempt to 
restrict district judge authority and discretion by writing more specific 
proposals.195 A concrete example relating to local proliferation is the 
recent experience with the local option provision for automatic disclo-
sure, which has increased inconsistency, fostered confusion and im-
posed expense and delay.196 The revisors should substitute for local op-
tion a mechanism that is premised on the withdrawn 1991 proposed 
amendment in Rule 83 because it better accommodates the conflicting 
needs to limit, as well as to apply and to experiment with, inconsistent 
local procedures.197 
Districts and individual judges should be attentive to the problems 
which accompany the adoption and enforcement of local requirements, 
especially procedures that conflict with the Federal Rules, United 
States Code provisions or strictures in other districts. Most impor-
the rule revisors worked assiduously to develop the 1993 amendments and were generally respon· 
sive to public input. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1610. See also supra notes 115-40 and accom-
panying text. 
193. See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text (suggestions for harmonizing); Tobias, 
supra note 25, at 1623-34 (more specific suggestions). I realize that this guidance is somewhat 
limited. See also infra note 197. 
195. I recognize the need to afford some discretion and flexibility to treat specific problems 
that arise and the difficulties entailed in writing precise proposals. See Colin S. Diver, The Opti-
mal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983). 
196. See supra notes 123-38, 168-69 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Considerably more guidance regarding the 
normal rule revision processes could be afforded. An important example is that Congress and the 
Supreme Court should assume very limited roles as ultimate gatekeepers. See Tobias, supra note 
25, at 1628 & n.231. See also supra notes 184-85, 188 and accompanying text (providing addi-
tional examples). 
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tantly, the courts and judges ought to abolish all local measures, partic-
ularly those prescribed by specific judges, which are unnecessary or in-
consistent; include the maximum number of remaining requirements in 
local rules; and reduce to writing all local procedures.198 Districts and 
judges should also retain the requisite flexibility to experiment with 
measures that contravene Federal strictures and to apply mechanisms 
which respond to troubling, peculiar local circumstances.199 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process con-
tributed substantially to understanding of process. This article has at-
tempted to elaborate Professor Yeazell's valuable work by expanding 
on his account, especially of power's accretion in courts of the first in-
stance, with immediate developments in process. This response also 
considers significant implications of modern process and affords sugges-
tions for treating the changed procedural circumstances. If those re-
sponsible for modern civil process implement these recommendations 
and apply Professor Y eazell's ideas, they should be able to improve 
process in the twenty-first century. 
198. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 1629. 
199. See id. See also supra note 167 and accompanying text. A word on the shift of public 
power into private hands is warranted. All procedural policymakers in making and applying proce-
dures should remember that this phenomenon generally disadvantages resource-poor litigants 
whom Congress has admonished should be treated solicitously. See supra notes 142-57 and ac-
companying text. 
